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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
~l.l\R\"IX J>E'fERSEN and
B~~\~ERL \ .. PE'fERSEN, his

Plaintiffs and

'vife,

Respo1Lde~nts,

vs.
\"().~{L

Case No.
10,113

MEl'HAM,
Defendant and Appella1Lt.

RESPONDENTS' BRIEF

S'rA'fEJIEN,.f OF NATURE OF CASE
1"his is an action by the Respondents, )!arvin
Jl etersen and Bever l.v Petersen. for rescission of a contract and demanding a reconveyance of realty situated
in the State of ''ryoming, which was conveyed by them
to ..~.\ppellant in exchange for an interest in seller's
contract of sale of property in Idaho, based upon
l'ertain misrepresentations alleged to have been made
by the ..~.\ppellant in order to induce the Respondents to
enter into the exchange.
'
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DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER C,QUR'f
The case was tried to the Court sitting without a
jury, and Respondents were awarded judgment, cancelling and rescinding a contract entered into by the
Appellant and Respondents and ordering a reconyeyance of the land in question to the Respondents.

RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The Respondents seek judgment of this Court
affirming the judgment and decree of the lower Court.

STATEMENT OF }_,ACTS
The Respondents agree in part with the Appellant's Statement of Facts, but in addition thereto desire
to call to the court's attention additional facts totally
ignored in the Appellant's Brief, and upon which the
Court below rested its Findings of Fact, Conclusions
of Law and the ultimate Judgment and Decree.
Prior to October 1, 1962, Respondents listed their
Wyoming ranch property for sale with Duffin Realty
through its licensed real estate agent, Glen Van Tassell.
At approximately the same time, the Appellant entered
into a listing agreement listing his purchaser's interest
in a motel property situated in Arco, Idaho, with the
same real estate company. Thereafter, the agent, Glen
Van Tassell, and the real estate broker, Gordon Duffin,
in company with the Appellant himself, made personal
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contacts \vith at least six prospective purchasers of the
interest of the i\ ppellaut in and to the .r\.rco ~lotel. In
the tirst part of ()etober. 196~, ( R 31) the Appellant,
\"an 'l.'assell and Duffin took one \ \rinn Nelson, a far1ner
of !Jayton. Idaho. to the Inotel for the purpose of selling
the ~\ ppcllunt's interest therei11 to Mr. Nelson. During
the l'ourse of their conversations, the Appellant told
all of those present. including \\'inn Nelson, that the
ntotel had n1ade hin1 $3,000.00 per month and that he
had books to prove it. (R 31) (R 124).
On a subsequent occasion, approximately the middle
of ()l'tober of the same year, (R 33) the Appellant met
Zola Beebe, Dek Nickolson, \ran Tassell and Duffin
at the 1notel and in the course of their conversations
the .i\ppellant told all who were present that the motel
hnd mnde him $3,000.00 per month. (R 34). Nickolson
was not satitied with the Appellant's records of income
and asked that tnore detailed information be procured.
'I' he . \ ppellant later on furnished a written operating
~ tate1nent to the office of Duffin Realty pursuant to
the request of l\lr. Nickolson. These records showed
a net inco1ne of approximately $3,000.00 per month.
1 R a;). \""an Tassell examined this record and later
displayed it to )Irs. Zola Beebe ( R 138) and Respondent. ~!arvin Petersen. (R 40).
\,.an Tassell and the Appellant later went to the
hotne of Dell X ebeker. another rancher in Star ,.,. alley,
''""roming. and offered the Appellant's interest in the
"\reo ~Iotel to him for sale. On that occasion the Appel-
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lant told this prospective buyer that this motel netted
him $3,000.00 per month. (R 127 & 128).
Another rancher, Mr. Alma Shumway, also of Star
Valley, Wyoming, had his farm for sale and he was colltacted by both Van Tassell and the Appellant and he
was told by either Van Tassell or Appellant in the
presence of both of them that the motel had showed a
$3,000.00 a month net profit for the Appellant. (R IB2).
Sometime in November of 1962, (R 136) )Irs.
Zola Beebe saw the motel for the first time. She 1net
the Appellant at the motel and the Appellant told her
and 'ran Tassell that he had averaged $3,000.00 per
month from his operation of the motel. (R 137). Later
on, in the office of Duffin Realty, Mrs. Beebe was
shown written records showing with some fluctuations
an approximtae net income of $3,000.00 per month. (R
138) . After seeing these records, Mrs. Beebe entered
into a contract to purchase and took over the motel on
the 2nd day of January, 1963. (R 138). She remained
there until the 13th of March of the same year. Later
on, Van Tassell brought Exhibit P4 to Mrs. Beebe,
(R 139) which was another operating statement subsequently submitted by the Appellant to the office of
Duffin Realty, and which had been typed by the Duffin
Realty secretary, Kay Lee.
Mrs. Beebe had also discovered some records in
the furnace room of the motel, Exhibit P5, and after
examining both P4 and P5, Mrs. Beebe told Mr. 'ran
Tassell that she wanted to come home (R 139). Both
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of these records show Appellant did not net $3,000.00
per 1nonth or anything close to it. She made no payment
under the ter1ns of the original contract with Appellant
whutsoe,·er (R 140), and after returning to Salt Lake
City catne to the office of Respondents' Counsel in
ccnnpnny with the Respondents and thereafter this law
suit was filed ( R 140).

\"an 'fassell's dealings with the Respondents came
in the tnidlst of these various negotiations. He first
contacted the1u concerning Appellant's interest in the
rnotel during the first part of December, 1962. (R 63).
ILe told them of the motel and what Appellant told
hin1 he made per month from its operation. ( R 63) . He
also showed Respondent, Marvin Petersen, the original
operating statetnent furnished to the office of Duffin
ltealty by Appellant showing approximately $3,000.00
per 1nonth net income. ( R 64) . The Plaintiff went
oYer these records with Van Tassell and subsequently
\rent home and discussed the records with his wife. ( R
fl4). Respondents relied upon what Van Tassell had
told them concerning the income of the motel and upon
this operating statement. (R 64). On or about December 20, 1962, the Respondents entered into an AgreeInent "·ith Appellant wherein Respondents purchased
59.asro of Appellant's agreements of sale with ~Irs.
Zola Beebe, and in return delivered a Deed of ConYeyance of the Respondents' interest in their ranch
111 Star '"'alley. 'Vyoming. (R 65).
4-\fter 'ran Tassell had been shown the second
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operating statement typed by Mrs. Kay Lee in the
early part of January, 1963, he had some argun1ents
with his broker, Gordon Duffin, concerning these records, (R 42) and he went to the Appellant and told
him these were not in accordance with the original
I'ecords Appellant had furnished to him. ( R -:1.2) • ''rhcn
'ran Tassell was asked for the substance of his conversation with Appellant, he testified as follows:
"Well, I told Mr. Mecham, I said, '\r oyl, this
is not the same set of records that we represented
this place to Mr. Petersen and Mrs. Beebe.' And
I said, 'Something has got to be done about it.
Mrs. Beebe is unhappy. This place isn't doing
the business she was told it would do. Mr. J>etersen relied on my figures when I sold him the
equity in this motel, and it was entirely misrepresented.' ''
Getting no satisfaction from either of these people,
he went first to Mrs. Beebe (R 43) and disclosed the
discrepancies and fraud which had been committed and
subsequently went to the Respondents and told the
whole story to them. (R 44). They contacted their
lawyers and this action was commenced. ( R 45).

STATEMENT OF POINTS
POINT I: THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX
F,INDING "THAT TO INDUCE THE PLAIXTIFFS TO ENTER INTO SAID WRITTEX
AGREEMEN'l., THE DEFENDANT REPRESENTED ('fO PLAINTIFFS) 'fRAT DURING
8
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<>I·'

'1,1~1~~

HE HAD OPERA'l,LlJ 'rilE ~IO'f.EL liE IIAD )lADE .t\X r\. \TElt"\t;E ~E'f l~l,OJIJ~: Ot' ~a,ooo.ooPER JlON'l'H;
·r 11~\'r 'r II IS ltE I>ItESEN'l,r\'l"ION \\r AS ,. \
~1"\'l'E I{ I r\1~ lt~~I>l{ I~: sENT AT ION.''

'I'IIE PEltl(JD

l,Ul~'f

ll. 'l'HE 'fRIAL COUR'l, I~,UR'fHElt
Eltltl~:u IX I~'INDlNG 'fHA,f THE PLAIN'rii·'I~,s \\'~~RE READY, WILLING AND r\.BLE
'l'(l l, . \ X C EL r\ND 'fERMIN A 'I'E T H E
.\CiltJ1:J~~l ~~~'f ll\'" AND BETWEEN ,fHE
11 .\RTIES.

l)OIN'f III: THE UNCONTRO\TERTED
'l'ES'l'lj\lON\T BY 'l"HE PLAINTIFFS Sl-IO'''"S
'l'll..\ T 1.,HE\T EN,fERED INTO 'l,HE COX'l'lt.t\l,1, \\'l'fH THE DEFENDANT BEl,.c\.USE~
(lF 1,11~~ l{El)RESENTATIONS BY 'rAN TASSELL
I'rH RESPECT TO MRS. BEEBE
.\Xll XO'l' BEC.AL;SE OF 'fHE REPRESEK'1\-\.'l'IOXS .c\S TO INCOME.

''r

ARGUMENT
POIXT I: 'l,HE TRIAL COURT ERRED IX
t,IXDIXG ''THAT TO INDUCE THE PLAIX'fi~,FS 'fO E~TER INTO SAID WRI'fTEX
4-\GREE~IEXT THE DEFENDANT RE~PRE
SEXTED (TO PLAINTIFFS) THAT Dl~RIX(-;
rrHE PERIOD OF TIME HE HAD OPE RAT-
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ED 1"'HE MO'fEL HE HAD 1\IADE AN 1\. \TEHAGE NE1" INCOME OF $3,000.00PER MON'fH;
THAT THIS REPRESENTA'I'ION '\r.t\S ~\
MATERIAL REPRESENTATION."
The Appellant first argues that the Court erred
in Finding of Fact No. 3 in two particulars:
l. In finding that Defendant made any represcu-

ta tion at all to the Plaintiffs, and
2. In finding that the alleged misrepresentation

was material.
The Respondents will argue these points in the
order set forth by the Appellant.
I. THE COURT DID NO'f ERR IN

~"'IND

ING THA'f APPELLANT MADE REPRESENTATIONS TO THE RESPONDEN'rS.
'fhe whole argument of the Appellant seems to be based
upon the fact that the Appellant had no personal dealings with the Respondents prior to the time that the
Respondents entered into the transaction with the Appellant. It is true that Mr. Petersen at no time claimed
to have had a personal conversation with Mr. Mecham
prior to entering into the contract. This, however, certainly does not defeat his right of action. The familiar
rule of law applicable to the case at bar has been well set
forth in the case of Crystal Pier Amusement Co. vs.
Cannan, (Cal.) 25 Pac.2d 839, 91 ALR 1357. That case
hodls that false representations, to be actionable, need
10
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not have hccu directly uutde to the person suing therefor,
hut it is sutt'icicnt if they 'vere made to a third persoll,
with the intention that they should reach the ears of
thl' Plaintitl' and he acted upon by him.
'fhe court further states:
..t\. representation made to one person with the
intention thut it shall reach the ears of another,
and be ucted upon by him, and which does reach
hin1, and is acted upon by hin1 to his injury, giYes
the person so acting upon it the same right to
relief or redress as if it had been 1nade to hin1
directly.'' Henry v. Dennis, (Maine) 49 Atlantic
H

58.

In the lleury case, we find this language:
''It is of no consequence that the letter was
directed to \V. S. Henry and Co1npany, when
it \\'as in fact relied upon by Henry as a member
of the fir1n of Henry & Parsons. It is not necessary~ in order for a Defendant to be liable for
the consequences of his misrepresentations, that
he should know the names of the persons to whom
the 1nisrepresentations may be communicated,
proYiued, he contemplated that they should be
comn1unicated to others and be acted upon by
then1. ''
In the case at bar, the Appellant, in the presence
of the real estate broker~ Duffin, and his authorized
ngent. '~an 'fassell, told a number of prospectiYe purl'hasers "·hat his income from the motel operation had
been. He told this in the forepart of October to 'Vinn
Xelson of Dayton, Idaho. Thereafter he told the same
thing to :\Irs. Zola Beebe and Dek Nickolson. Later he
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told the same thing to Dell Nebeker and Alma Shunlway. All of these statements were made on occasiou~
in which he was endeavoring to sell his motel interest
and to persons he hoped would be interested in purchasing it. Certainly, it does not take argument to persuade anyone that one of the vital considerations any
prospective purchaser would have in the motel property
or any interest therein would be what the past perforinance of the motel had been under the operation of the
proposed seller. In the case at bar, each of the prospective purchasers who testified were advised either by
the Appellant himself, or by Van 'fassell in the presence of the Appellant that this motel had produced a
net income to the Appellant of $3,000.00 per month.
The Appellant having so represented his earnings fro1n
the motel in the presence of the rea1 estate broker and
authorized agent of the company with whom he listed
the property for sale, can hardly express surprise that
Van Tassell, in attempting to sell the Appellant's interest in the property to the Respondents, told them
that the motel had netted the Appellant $3,000.00 a
month during the period of time he operated it, and
showed the Respondent, Marvin Petersen, the books
and records to that effect, which had been delivered to
Duffin Realty by the Appellant. The facts in this
case fall clearly within the rules set forth in Crystal
Pier Amusement Co. vs. Cannan, and which rule has
also been set forth in 23 Am. Jur., page 955, as follows:
"In order to be relied upon, a representation
may be, and frequently is, made directly to the
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injured person hy the perso11 sought to be
<.'hargcd. lJireet state1nent to a representee. however, is not ah,·ays necessary in order to give
sut·h rep1·esentce a right to rely upon a statement
nuule. for it is inunaterial whether it is made to
hin1 directly or .. indirectly, or whether it passes
through a direet or circuitous channel in reaching
hitn. provided it is made with the intent that it
shall reach hitn and be acted upon by him, and
that such intent is in fact accotnplished. For
exa1nple, a representation may be relied upon
if it is n1ade to a third person to be communicated
to the complaining person, or with a view of
reaching and influencing him, or to a third person
in his presence with a view to influence him, or
if it is tnade to a class of persons of whom the
con1plaining party is one, or even if it is made
to the public generally with a view to its being
acted upon and the complaining party, as one
of the public, acts on it and suffers damage
thereby. It is not necessary that the person making a representation knows the names of the
persons to 'vhom it may be communicated, pro,~ided he contemplates that it shall be cotnmunicated to others and be acted upon by them.''
:E,·en if it \vere argued that the Appellant did not
kno"· the llespondents personally at the time representation "·as Inade to them, certainly he knew he had
this interest in the motel property listed for sale and
that inquiries concerning the past operation of the
n1otel "~bile it "·as under his management and ownership \\·ould be communicated by the broker and his
agents in the same manner the Appellant had represented the operation of the motel to the broker and his
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agent. Presumably, he would be anxious to have this
infor1nation given to all prospective purchasers inasmuch as he had freely given the san1e infor1nation hiin·
self, in the presence of the broker and the agent, to
several other prospective purchasers. 'fhere is no evidence that he ever, at any time, attempted to withdraw
this information until January, when he furnished the
second set of records to Duffin Realty. It was this seeond set of books which were so far different fron1 the
representations made to the Respondents, l\frs. lJeebc
and the other prospective purchasers, that caused ~Irs.
Beebe to leave the motel, refusing to make any payn1ent
on the contract. Then, upon the obtaining the true facts,
the Respondents commenced this action for recission.
'I~ he

Appellant in the first full paragraph of his
Brief, at page 8 thereof, makes a most interesting
observation. The statement beginning with the second
sentence states as follows:
"This appears from the fact that Van Tassell
was the listing agent for both the parties, and
thus, his representations are not chargeable to
the Defendant any more than they are chargeable to the Plaintiffs."
The statement is true that Van Tassell was the
agent for both parties. It would, therefore, follow that
'ran '"l~assell was the agent for the Appellant in representing to the Respondents and all prospective purchasers the operation of the motel, and Van Tassell
would be the agent of the Respondents for the purpose
of representing their ranch in Star Valley, Wyoming,
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to all prospective purchasers. 'l,hus, the representation
of ,. an 'l'assl'll us ag·ent for the Appellant in representing thl' 1nonthly incotne frotn the motel to the Respondents \\'otdd be chargeable to the Appellant. The Trial
Court felt it \vas not necessary under the facts of this
l'ast' to tind that ,. ~lll 'fassell was the Appellant's agent
in connection 'vith the representations made because of
the prior rule heretofore set forth. However, the agency
rule to 'vhich the Appellant has alluded in his Brief
would charge the .~\ ppellant with the false representations rna de hy \,.an 'fassell.
2. 'fHE COLTRT DID NOT ERR IN FINDI~(;

'fl-lr\.'r 'fHE ALLEGED )llSREPRESEXTi\1"ION ''rAS l\IATERIAL. The next argutnent of the Appellant is founded upon Appellant's
eontention that the interest acquired by the Respondl'nts "·as not in the motel or its income, but merely a
t'rnction of the Appellant's sellers' interest in the contract bet,veen the Appellant and ~Irs. Zola Beebe. The
4\ppellant argues that the interest acquired by the
l{espondents "·as not an interest in the motel itself,
and, therefore, they had no right to rely upon the representations as to income. It is argued that these representations \vould only be 1naterial between l\Irs. Beebe
and the .L-\ ppellant and could not be a material consideration for the inducement of the transaction between
4-\ppellant and Respondents .

.L-\s principal authority for the proposition that the
reported income from the Appellant's operation of the
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motel is immaterial and collateral to the trausactio11
between the Appellant and Respondents, Appellaut
cites 23 Am. Jur.~ Section 113, on Fraud and Deceit.
Here Appellant cites the first part of paragraph 11:3.
but does not quote the last part of the paragraph. 'fhe
last part is most significant and provides as follo"·s:
''It has been held, however, that they need not
relate directly to the nature and character of the
subject matter of the contract, but that it is sufficient if they are so closely connected with the
contract that the parties would not, except for
the representations, have entered into it, and by
such reprseentations were induced to enter into
it to the knowl~,dge of the other party."
Furthermore the test of materiality of the representation has been well stated in 37 CJS~ page 252, in
the following language:
"A false representation to be actionable, or,
likewise, a false concealment to be actionable,
must relate to a Ina tter rna terial to the transaction involved; that is, the false representation or
concealment 1nust be the efficient, inducing and
proximate cause, or the determining ground, of
action or omission. Thus, representations are
material if the transaction would not have occurred in their absence or with knowledge of
their falsity, and if they are related directly to
the transaction involved. Likewise, the concealment of facts which, if known, would have influenced a party to refrain from action causing
injury has been held material. A representation
is i1nmaterial if the same thing would have been
done in the same way in the absence of such
representation; and, in general, failure to dis-
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close facts \\'hich did not substantially affect the

trattsaetiotl have been held immaterial. Representations nrc likewise immaterial if they caused
no injury. or if they were mere expressions of
opinion on '"hieh the hearer had no right to rely.,,

'ro

test the ~ase at bar by these principals, we ask
the question as to \vhether the Respondents would haYc

entered into their transaction 'vith the r\.ppellants except for the statetnents reported to them concerning
the net incotne of the motel.

In the first place, they had never seen the motel
itself. 'fhis \\·as because the Respondent, Marvin Petersen. had back trouble, and could not ride in an autotnobile. (It 72). However, the Respondent, Marvin
l )etersen, exatnined the books and records furnished
to Duffin llealty by the Appellant. He testified that
he discussed these same records with his wife, and that
they relied upon this information before being willing
to enter into the transaction. The report that the motel
had been sho"·ing this profit to the Appellant was a
prin1e consideration to them. In the event the pur('hnser failed in the payment of the contract, the past
record of incon1e "·as a material consideration as to
"·hat kind of property the Respondents could expect
to take back and 'vha t kinds of expectations they "·ould
have in contetnplating a resale of the property.
Certainly. the n1a tter of the record of income of the
prior o'vner of the motel is not a collateral and immaterial item to the Respondent. If it had been represented
to haYe had a poor prior existence, one might expect
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a new purchaser would have a similar experience and
hence, this would be a questionable investment. \\rhere
it is represented that the motel operation was sho,riug
a good profit, one might expect a new purchaser of th('
property to have a similar profitable experience fron1
which one might expect a good record of contract payments. Therefore, under the tests set forth by the
authorities cited above, there can be no question but
what the representations of prior income were very
material considerations. As a matter of fact, as testified
by Van Tassell, the real estate agent, these representations were the very basis upon which he sold the fractional interest of the Appellant's contract equity in the
motel to the Respondents.
POIN'f II. THE TRIAL COURT FURTHER
ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE PLAINTIFFS WERE READY, WILLING AND ABL~:
TO CANCEL AND TERMINATE THE
AGREEMENT BY AND BETWEEN THE
PARTIES.
The Appellant argues that there is no record to
support that portion of Finding of Fact No. 3 which
states the Plaintiffs at all times have been read~, willing and able to cancel and terminate the written agreement by and between the parties terminating any
interest they may have acquired therein and returning
the same to the Defendant. Paragraph 7 of the Coinplaint on file herein (R 2) states as follows:
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"'rhat the J>Iaintiffs are rea<ly. 'villing and
able to carH.·el and terrninate the written agreenlent nutrkcd ~:xhihit ''.t-\" attached hereto and
return any interest they tnay have by reason
thereof to the I )efendant."
'l'his tender and offer \vas made far in advance of
any foreclosure of the seller's interest by reason of
non-payn1ent. One sentence in the Pre-trial Order
ngreed to by both parties is as follows:
··'rhe parties agree t~t both Plaintiffs and
llefendant have lost all of their equity in the
1notel since this action was commenced.'"' (Emphasis added).
lrnder the terms of the Pre-Trial Order, there was
no issue requiring any proof on this point. After the
Cornplaint had been filed, if the Appellant had wished
to have his contract equity restored, he could have had
it inunedia tely. Rescission is all that the Respondents
hnYe ever asked for in this case. As set forth in the
Pre-trial Order, the interest in the contract was lost
hy reason of non-payment of the payments, but this
loss occurred after the action was commenced. This
then becan1e the risk assumed by the Appellant in this
case. lie knew that after the property had been tendered
back to hitn. if he refused to accept it, the property may
thereafter be lost by reason of non-payment and if the
Respondents prevailed that this loss would be his. He
ehose to assun1e that risk and, therefore, cannot be
heard to con1plain at this time. It is further submitted
that upon the reading of the entire record and exami-
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nation of the evidence adducced at the trial, it is extremely doubtful that in losing the Appellant's socalled interest in the motel, anything of value was in
fact lost.

POINT III: 'fHE UNCON'l'ROVER'l'ED
'I'ES'T IMONY BY THE PLAIN'l,IFF'S SHO\V :-;
'l,HAT THEY ENTERED INTO THE COX'fRACT WITH THE DEFENDANT BECAUSE
0~_, THE REPRESEN'l'ATIONS BY VAN 'r.AsSELL WITH RESPECT '1"'0 MRS. BEEBE
AND NOT BECAUSE OF THE REPRES~~X
TATIONS AS TO INCOME.
It is true that one of the considerations leading the
Respondents to enter into the contract with the Appellant were the representations by Van Tassell concerning the character of Mrs. Zola Beebe and her ability
to operate and manage the motel in a profitable manner.
The Appellant here argues that this was the only basis
upon which the Respondents entered into the contract.
To so argue is to totally ignore the record in this case.
On cross examination in several places counsel for the
Appellant tried to get an admission from the Respondent, Marvin Petersen, that he was only relying on Van
Tassell's representation as to the character and ability
of Mrs. Beebe. These various encounters between counsel for the Appellant and the witness, Marvin Petersen,
appear for several pages. (R 74, 75 and 76). Time
and again the witness told counsel for the Appellant
that while he was relying upon representations with
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n·speet to ~Irs. l~eebe, he also relied upon the representation that the n1otel had netted the prior o'vner
~:J,OOO.OO per Inonth in incorne. }4~urthermore, on direct
exarninution. the record is replete with statements that
the ltespondents relied upon what they were told by
ran 'fassell and \vhat they were shown by , . . an 'rassell
\rus the operation of the r\. ppellant during· the period
of tirne he had opera ted this rnotel. The evidence is not
only an1ple on \vhich the court could so find. The evidence repeats over and over again that the outstanding
n1uterial representation upon which the Respondents
relied as an inducement to enter into this contract with
the i\ ppellant \vas the representation that the prior
O\rner had been making a net profit of $3,000.00 per
n1onth frorn his operation of the motel. The Respondents
need not seek out a fragment of the record to this effect
and then urg-e this court on appeal to sustain the Trial
Court under familiar rules of law. Rather, the Respondents tnerely invite the Court to examine the record
because in that examination the Court will find an
abundance of evidence to the effect that the primary
inducetnent used by the real estate salesman and the
prirnary basis upon wihch the Respondents entered
into this contract was founded upon the representation
ntade of past incorne from the Appellant's operation of
the motel.
Furthern1ore, as the court observed in the last
sentence of its ~Ien1orandum Decision, "If it were a
que~tion of , . . an Tassell's testimony alone, the result
n1ight be different, but hy the testimony of the many
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others who testified it clearly appears that the Defendant hi1nself induced the contract in question by fraud."
'fhe various witnesses brought forward by the l{cspondents showed a clear pattern in which the Appellant
himself had represented openly and on various occasions
that this motel had netted him $3,000.00 per month
during the months he had operated it and that he had
books to support it. '!.,here was evidence that these books
were shown to the Respondents and the record is clear
that they relied upon these representations as inducement to enter into the contract with the Appellant. It is
beyond the comprehension of the writer how the Appellant can seriously urge upon this Court that the representations of income were not given any real consideration by the Respondents in connection with their entering into the contract in question.
CONCLUSION
Respondents respectfully submit that each of the
essential elements in the Trial Court's Finding of Fact
and Conclusions of Law are fully supported by competent evidence, that the Court committed no error in
so finding, and that the decision of the Trial Court
should be affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
KIRTON & BETTILYON
W. W. KIRTON, JR.
336 South Third East
Salt Lake City, Utah
Attorneys for Respondents
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